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1 INTRODUCTION 
The language and artefacts of smart grids are increasingly becoming part of the landscape of urban 
electricity provision. These range from state mandated roll-outs of smart meters to neighbourhood and city-
scale innovation projects designed to test the means through which information technologies and new forms 
of storage, generation and demand management can be integrated in contemporary cities. Yet, despite their 
significant political, economic and social consequences, research on smart grids to date has focused on their 
technical components. There has been limited discussion of the social and geographical dimensions of what 
we argue are in many ways urban processes. We argue that it is through the coming together of urban and 
national, private and public, social and technical as well as real and imagined geographies in multi-scalar 
assemblage processes that smart urban energy projects are developed and come to have consequences for 
communities. In this chapter we examine these processes by drawing on case studies from the UK and USA 
through which we highlight the different outcomes being created in each context as well as their common 
elements. 
In understanding the city through its relation to energy and infrastructure we draw on the assemblage 
thinking  of writers such as Blok (2012) and McFarlane (2011). We suggest that smart urbanism, with which 
this volume is concerned, can be understood as a relational process of assemblage in which the found objects 
of the urban fabric – power cables, gas pipes, buildings, roads and so on - are re-purposed around a new 
governmental rationales. These are combined with the inserted materialities of meters, data loggers, control 
room dashboards and screens to create newly alert cities which produce and use energy in markedly 
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different ways to what had been normal in the second half of the twentieth century. This process of 
assemblage is not a simple one however, nor is it one in which all relations are equal. Instead, we show in 
the chapter that these are processes which seek to establish the conditions for the cultivation of certain 
dispositions and new socio-technical means for ‘conducting the conduct’ of the self, family members and in 
some cases entire communities (Foucault, 1982; Crampton, 2007a online).  This is a key aspect of smart 
grids as entities being actively assembled through urban politics; the sense in which they are socio-technical 
(both material and discursive) apparatus that seek to alter, “the nature of the connection that can exist 
between … heterogeneous elements” (Foucault 1977, cited in Crampton 2007b, online). Furthermore, they 
represent an urban response to several threats to the current system of energy provision. Foucault argued that 
this is a common feature of the despositif, the ‘thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble’ of governmental 
apparatus; “[the dispositive] has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an 
urgent need” (emphasis in the original, Foucault 1977, cited in Crampton 2007b online). The perceived 
urgent need in this context comes from the emerging crisis of the grid through what is widely referred to as 
the ‘energy trilemma’; the need to modernise the grid to provide cities with affordable, secure and low 
carbon energy. 
 We argue that the imposition of smart grids on cities and the cultivation of variously socio-technically 
enabled smart dispositions in citizens creates new lines and of urban politics which in some instances can be 
overcome through the configuration of new relations as seen in the air source heat pump case study in 
Section 3.1. In other contexts however urban inequalities risk being intensified.  By focussing attention and 
resources on the priorities of those most able to influence alignment of relations in the relational city – those 
building the smart city – the co-production of the urban energy assemblages is pushing the concerns of 
others yet further from the foreground. In developing this argument we show in Section 3.2’s discussion of 
the Pecan Street Project in Austin, Texas how smart energy projects can intensify the socialisation of various 
risks and the privatisation of rewards which has been so powerfully shown to be a feature of contemporary 
capitalism (Harvey 2001: 353).    
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Using two case studies we suggest that the urban figures as a frontier for the development of and 
experimentation with smart grids understood as socio-material assemblages gathering in urban contexts 
around discourses of sustainability, optimisation and security. We argue that smart grids are being 
operationalised in urban contexts through a set of neo-liberal apparatus and techniques by a diversity of 
actors. While these socio-material configurations exceed the urban in multiple ways, the development of 
smart grids is intimately connected to cities as sites of intervention for transformations in the ownership, 
logics and fabrics of power networks. 
In making this argument we develop two claims about the development and deployment of smart grids and 
suggest that their social and political consequences could be quite profoundly different from existing 
systems of power supply and use, the histories of which we set out in the first part of the chapter. Firstly we 
suggest that smart grids are being made possible by a governmental double-logic in that while some state 
institutions are rolling further back from privatised energy provision through other institutions and apparatus 
the state can be seen to be rolling-forward. In doing so state institutions are playing new roles in these 
arrangements and this, we argue,  has consequences for the urban as municipal authorities begin to co-
produce urban energy networks in new ways. This requires us to move beyond the binary in which 
economies are either neo-liberal or state-managed to consider new roles and responsibilities for state 
institutions in smart urban assemblages.  
Secondly, we argue that urban smart grids emerge from a tension between the political economy of 
networked places and the regulated territorial spatiality of the pre-existing energy economy. We refer here 
on the one hand to urban political economies in which local power geometries have shaped the fabric and 
function of cities and as a result of which communities are variously affecting and being affected by the 
emergence of smart urban projects. On the other hand however these place-based processes occur alongside 
regional and national energy markets and must connect with structures and flows that exceed the urban in 
many ways. We are suggesting that the work done to articulate these otherwise disconnected processes is an 
important feature of smart urban power projects. 
1.1 URBAN AS SMART ENERGY FRONTIER 
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Interpretations of what constitutes a smart power network vary considerably, but in general ‘smart grid’ 
usually refers to schemes introducing information and communication technologies (ICTs) and use of data 
into energy networks in order to overcome perceived problems. Most often these are connected to some 
combination of a powerful drive (whether political, commercial or environmental) to shift away from fossil 
fuel based energy services to renewables while at the same needing to reduce or defer the very large 
investments in network and generating assets required to maintain security of supply. The sense in which a 
response is needed, and now, comes both from the urgency of several calls to move away from fossil fuels 
as well as the dilemma facing network managers. The expected switch to renewables has been anything but 
a switch, indeed it as thus far been more of an addition meaning that the power system must both remain 
able to work as it has in recent decades by energising cities with power transmitted from remote power 
stations while also facilitating the steady emergence of wind and solar generation in the city. The urban 
arena represents a particular challenge in this regard, and one to which smart has emerged as a ‘solution’.  
Beyond the hype about the potential of smart grids and their future significance, “actually existing” smart 
grids are usually only visible in specific demonstration projects and interventions. In 2013 there were 
estimated to be more than 200 smart grid projects in operation around the world (Lewis 2013), and by 2014 
the EU had recorded a catalogue of 459 in the EU alone. The majority of smart grid projects at an advanced 
stage are being developed in urban areas across Western Europe, North America and Australia. That 
experimental energy projects are taking place in cities is not new. Electricity grids originally emerged as 
privately developed and owned entities in cities, with their local monopoly protected by the presence of 
considerable upfront capital costs and a relative abundance of un-wired spaces rather than regulation but 
taken together these factors meant that territorial competition was uncommon. Indeed, by 1918, such was the 
spread of demand and the multiple forms of supply for electrical power that in London alone there were 
seventy authorities, fifty different types of systems, ten different frequencies and twenty four different 
voltages (Butler, 2001) all serving the growing metropolis. A growing social and political call for universal 
provision however led to various rounds of national institutionalisation, regulation and outright ownership 
changes which led to the early and essential urban geographies of electricity provision becoming relatively 
invisible if not largely forgotten.  This matters in that it leads us to reconsider what we encounter in smart 
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urban energy projects as a return to the city as a test-bed for (re-)electrification rather than an entirely novel 
process. Most centrally we must once again regard this new phase of power provision as a local and 
geographically variegated phenomena just as was witnessed in London and other cities in the 19th and early 
20th centuries. We must become attuned to the outcomes of this process for those on the ‘receiving end’ 
(Massey, 1993) of smart grid experiments; with particular streets and communities winning and losing out 
through the project rather than  national plan based approach to infrastructure provision. 
Furthermore, historically several factors have contributed to the removal of electricity provision from the 
urban geographic imagination in the UK and US. These have been both political and technical.  In the inter-
war period in the UK for example the Electric Power Supply Committee recommended the appointment of 
electricity commissions that would divide the country into district boards which would take over power 
generation and distribution in their area (Biscoe, 2014). By 1926 The Electricity Act sought to integrate the 
British electricity supply industry by establishing a 132 KV AC synchronous grid under the newly created 
Central Electricity Board (Butler, 2001). Doing so required the use and eventual codification of alternating 
current (AC) generation which was able to use transformers to manipulate voltage at will so that networks 
could cover much greater distances, in line with and able to serve the national geography of energy 
governance. Through this socio-technical accomplishment these networks became the robust and long 
lasting materialities of a national geography of power production and consumption over the course of the 
mid- and late-twentieth century. This came with a large-few to small-many topology of production and 
consumption which enabled growing and densely populated cities to be energised by distant power stations 
(Patterson, 2013), leaving their populations largely unaware of the electrical metabolism of their everyday 
lives.  As the post-war period progressed across Europe, North America, Australia and parts of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, power delivery become firmly established as a feature of national status and a symbolic 
projection of modernity. This was accompanied by a supply-side logic of expand and upgrade which 
“encouraged the development of large-scale, centralized infrastructure systems of extensive physical 
networks drawing on increasingly distant natural resources” (Guy et al. 2001: 5.), amplifying the 
distanciated relation between power and urban communities. In many ways the re-introduction of energy 
generation in the city and the accompanying re-configuration of the grid is reversing this process with the 
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effect that urban communities are once again being confronted with the materialities and constraints of 
power supply. 
 
We argue that in the contemporary context a new phase of grid-management is emerging (Ofgem 2011) 
which seeks to intensify some of the characteristics of marketised infrastructures that became widespread in 
the late twentieth century. In important ways however it goes beyond the single, simple and spatially one-
dimensional narrative of nationally bound markets for energy. Brown has argued that, “this century will see 
the localisation of energy production” (Brown, 2011: 206)), which we see as a process unfolding alongside 
Graham and Marvin’s argument about the emergence of an, “entirely new infrastructural landscape that 
radically challenges established assumptions that have underpinned the relations between integrated 
networks and cities” (Graham and Marvin 2001: 139). Taken together these two processes of localisation 
and utility integration through ICT are renewing and deepening the relation between cities and energy 
networks through and as a result of smart urban power projects. Evidence of this can be found in the 
concentration of European smart grid funding allocated to a small number of urban ‘hot spots’ where 
collaborations between DNOs, TSOs and universities have been most effective in forming smart grid 
projects. The places most likely to host smart grid projects are, according to the EU’s 2014 review of all 
smart grid research in Europe, in, “the vicinity of major organizations involved in research, innovation, or 
managing the national or regional transmission networks (major cities as London, Paris, Brussels, 
Barcelona, Roma or university centers as Bilbao, Grenoble, Arnhem, Karlsruhe, Copenhagen)” (Covrig, 
Ardelean et al. 2014: 37). These criteria, of course, mean that urban sites are particularly likely to be arenas 
for smart grid research.  
These criteria point to the ways in which the urban is essential to smart power. While the logic of universal 
provision of electricity embedded in national energy projects could effectively bypass geographical 
difference, the logic of smart grids is both dependent upon and constitutive of locally differentiated forms of 
power production and use. As urban geographies become key to the development of new forms of power 
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provision and changing patterns of electricity use, previously invisible relations between the urban and the 
network come to matter in material and political terms.  
A future based much more heavily on distributed generation dispersed throughout the urban fabric of cities 
poses serious technical and social challenges both for cities and the grid. Without viable electrical storage 
technology1 , ‘smart’ demand will need to be supply-synced via context-specific technical and cultural 
devices. These include in-home displays and market mechanisms through which the ways in which people 
demand energy is reconfigured around the new smart grid assemblages. This is in stark contrast to both the 
Fordist – Keynesian model of universal power provision of the post-wart period but also is markedly 
different to the period of liberalisation and unrestrained consumption that followed. In both these previous 
contexts the supply processes was demand-led through the use of flexible, predominantly fossil fuelled, 
power generators which could be ramped up or down to match demand the demand of cities without ever 
imposing constraints on energy use. In the smart grid, flexibility must be induced into energy demand to 
compensate for the increasing inflexibility of renewable, local and non-storable supply. 
Smart grid assemblages promise to, “improve both the physical and economic operation of the electricity 
system by making it more sustainable and robust, more efficient by reducing losses while at the same time 
offering economic advantages for all stakeholders” (Verbong, Beemsterboer et al. 2013: 117) Furthermore, 
in bringing about this transformation in energy provision and use, smart grids also resonate with attempts 
elsewhere in the governance of cities to leverage, “networked infrastructures to improve economic and 
political efficiency and enable social, cultural and urban development” (Hollands 2008: 307).  Delivering on 
these promises remains challenging however and in the following case studies we draw out  some of the 
political and social consequences for cities and their citizens. 
2 CASE STUDIES 
                                                             
1 There are currently no commercially available, large scale electricity storage technologies that can store electrical energy 
at even neighbourhood scale. 
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Before proceeding to develop our two claims regarding the public-private character of smart grids and the 
tensions between territorial and topological processes therein we first introduce the two case studies on 
which the chapter draws. 
2.1 UK SMART GRIDS- THE CUSTOMER LED NETWORK REVOLUTION  
The CLNR project is a partnership between Durham and Newcastle Universities, a major UK gas and 
electricity supplier (British Gas) and North East England and Yorkshire’s low voltage distribution network 
operator (Northern Powergrid). The project is funded through the UK’s Low Carbon Network Fund, a 
centrally managed fund established by the national energy regulator Ofgem to provide incentives and 
directly fund power system innovation. The project features experiments with a range of social, technical 
and socio-technical innovations on the low voltage network and in customers’ homes. These include 
conventional and ‘smart’ heat pumps, time of use tariffs, electric vehicle charge points, a range of grid-side 
electrical energy storage devices (battery storage), photo-voltaic panels and in-home displays in various 
combinations each studied a discreet ‘test-cell’. The project collected consumption data from over 10,000 
homes and small organisations, each of whom was invited to take complete an online survey which resulted 
in 913 valid responses. 186 of the participants also took part in a qualitative research visit which included a 
semi-structured interview and an energy tour of their home or premises. Drawing on CLNR, we consider the 
economic and political geographies of spatially and temporally overlapping and interacting processes 
already active in UK energy systems.  We examine the interactions between efforts to cultivate a nation of 
‘smart’ consumers in UK electricity supply markets and the development of new forms of locally specific 
urban ‘network flexibility’. 
[INSERT IMAGE 1: The low voltage smart grid as imagined in the UK context] 
2.2 AUSTIN AND THE PECAN STREET PROJECT  
The Pecan Street Project (PSP) in Austin, Texas, is a non-profit public-private partnership that hopes to 
provide a ‘proving ground’ for technologies and ideas that can be used to advocate, “changing the rules, 
changing the market, providing new incentives [and] educating consumers” (Interview, Environmental 
Defence Fund representative). It is focused on a volunteer group of 1,000 residents and seventy five 
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commercial businesses in the city’s Mueller district, a planned urban development  on a former airport 
undergoing redevelopment, and operates as a 501(c)3 venture – a non-profit organisation which can attract 
tax deductible charitable donations. Although the University of Texas provided an initial $50,000 to 
kickstart the project major work did not begin until the US Department of Energy provided a $10.4 million 
grant in November 20092. This grant money has been matched with $14 million from external partner 
organisations, mainly private companies, providing funding for research for five years. 
In the PSP case study presented here we draw on interviews with a range of actors involved in the project 
including managers, directors, business owners and administrators from private, public and voluntary 
sectors. This is in contrast to the CLNR case study from the UK which draws on interviews with 
householders. 
[INSERT IMAGE 2: Solar SunFlowers - a public art installation on the edge of Austin's Mueller district that 
helps power a nearby retail park] 
Drawing on these case studies we develop two arguments about the emergence of smart grids.  
3 PUBLIC-PRIVATE URBAN SMART GRID ASSEMBLAGES  
The first of our two claims is that the development of smart grids in urban contexts comes with a double – 
logic. In some senses these initiatives can be interpreted as a further intensification of the privatisation of 
energy provision and marketization of energy use, through which energy use can be more accurately 
measured, traded and customers made more flexible and fluid than at any time in the history of networked 
power provision. While the marketization of energy systems was accompanied by a rolling-back of the state 
the creation of these newly sensory networks is being done, in many cases, through public-private 
innovation projects in which local and national state institutions are in some senses rolling-forward. State 
institutions are acting to structure and subsidise projects through mechanisms such as the UK’s Low Carbon 
Network Fund and the US government’s 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to fund energy 
                                                             
2 (The DoE itself was awarded $36.7 billion under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
to develop renewable generation and promote conservation and efficiency schemes across the 
country). 
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initiatives, which has led the New York Times to call it the, “biggest energy bill in history” (New York 
Times, 2009, online).  At the same time, state institutions are actively directing interactions within smart 
energy systems. In the UK for example, a Smart Energy Code has been established as a formal code of 
conduct that governs the all interactions between parties in smart power system. Meanwhile a licensed and 
heavily regulated monopoly contractor has been appointed as the Data Control Company which will perform 
data flow, access and will curate smart meter data on behalf of customers (who remain the owners of the 
data) and any party seeking to access their energy use data. Smart grid projects can therefore be seen as co-
produced hybrids of state and private interest which emerge from partnerships and which have context-
specific social and environmental consequences. This pattern of public-private partnership can be seen in the 
2014 review of smart grid projects in the EU in which the 459 projects were found to have a (mean) average 
of nine partnering organisations per project. Among the parties listed municipalities, public authorities and 
the government feature in a list of other, private, entities co-experimenting in mostly urban contexts (Covrig, 
Ardelean et al. 2014).  
We suggest that the emergence of new forms of ‘smart’ energy provision works by drawing together actors, 
materialities and communities each with their own political and economic geographies into smart grid 
coalitions,  echoing wider public-private partnerships common in the late 1990s and early part of the twenty 
first century in urban and infrastructure governance. Smart grid coalitions, by loosely bundling concerns 
regarding environment, social justice, urban competitiveness and commercial risk management together in 
awkwardly inclusive initiatives, have created a consensual, multi-level and multi-stakeholder mode of 
intervening simultaneously in the city and in the energy network. These developments can be characterised 
as representing ‘socio-technical fixes’ (Hodson and Marvin 2014: 123) and as extensions of the urban 
entrepreneurialism of the 1990s (Harvey 1989, Wood 1998).  Smart grids, we suggest, are one such 
‘sustainability fix’ around which actors and discourses are beginning to establish positions in the urban 
arena. The effect is that ideas about what it means for the city to be smart are consolidated and made stable 
through a consensual urban politics of strategic partnerships between elite and or powerful actors such as 
utilities, universities, housing providers and state institutions. 
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3.1 PUBLIC-PRIVATE HEATING IN TYNESIDE 
To develop these ideas we draw on a trial of domestic air source heat pumps that was part of the CLNR 
project.  322 air source heat pumps were installed in homes in the North and North East of England in 
connection with the CLNR project, most of them clustered together on particular distribution network 
feeders to enable analysis of their combined effects on the distribution network at urban network scale. An 
air source heat pump (ASHP) is a device that uses electricity to recover low level ambient heat energy in the 
air outside a building for use in the building’s space or water heating systems. These devices are typically in 
the range of 300% – 500% efficient, meaning that for every unit of electricity they use they produce 3 to 5 
units of heat. Drawing on interviews and home energy tours conducted with eighteen participants from the 
322 ASHP users involved in the trial we comment here on the co-produced nature of the trial and what it 
reveals about the relation between national, regional and local energy economies and places. 
Finding hundreds of households in which to install heat pumps was the role of the energy supplier on the 
project British Gas (who, despite their name, are the biggest electricity supplier in Great Britain). British 
Gas operate across the entirety of Great Britain and the design of the CLNR project mirrored the UK’s 
unbundled market structure in that the supplier was responsible for all customer interactions while the DNO 
was responsible for all network interventions. The ASHP trial however required a re-bundling and 
augmentation of these roles as the trial needed a locally clustered group of customers in order to test the 
combined local effects of widespread electrification of domestic heat services. 
In order to recruit locally concentrated customers to the trial a third party partner was required as British 
Gas’s customer base does not follow the urban geography of the network as each household can choose to 
be supplied by (and thus have a relationship with) any supplier with a license to operate in the UK. In 
contrast the DNO has continuous feeder wires that were to be equipped with monitors to sense the combined 
local effects of the ASHPs at substations. A new entrant to the energy provision system was needed to 
overcome this mis-match between national-market vs local-material  geographies. This partner was local 
social landlord South Tyneside Homes, an arms-length management organisation (ALMO) created by South 
Tyneside Council to manage, maintain and improve its council homes and estates (South Tyneside Homes 
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2014). STC is a non-profit-making company that is 100% owned by South Tyneside Council, the municipal 
government. As an ALMO, South Tyneside Homes facilitated access to a housing estate in which all homes 
were served by the regional DNO and all residents had a relationship with a single housing provider. This 
became an important relationship that British Gas were able to use to both achieve operational efficiencies  
but also to manage customer questions, complaints and to provide opportunities for residents to speak to 
representatives of all CLNR project partner organisations. In doing so, the trial of ASHPs used place-bound 
relationships created and maintained by municipally owned housing providers to work around and overcome 
the tensions of the unbundled private energy sector.   
A further obstacle was encountered however which highlighted the uneven geographies of infrastructure 
access. Most of the residents recruited to the trial did not have a home internet connection – with the 
majority either having no internet access at all or using mobile internet only. This meant that the data from 
the ASHP and domestic circuit monitors would be unable to flow back to the project’s data centre. To 
overcome this issue British Gas had to take on the responsibility of being an internet service provider to the 
housing estate, which was both an operational challenge and a novel move for the energy supplier but was 
essential in order to make this particular smart grid initiative feasible. In so doing, British Gas crossed over 
from being a competitive energy supplier to become, in this place and time, and public internet provider, 
providing an illuminating example of  the blurring of boundaries, roles and responsibilities that are more 
typical of smart grid assemblages than exceptional features of this case. 
We argue that this exemplifies in many ways that the geographies of smart energy do not tessellate neatly 
and that the tensions between supplier and DNO spatialities require place based partnerships that exceed the 
vertically imagined unbundled electricity system. In this way these place-based relationships in which 
municipal government and its subsidiaries are central actors become valuable to the grid and lead to local 
state and quasi-state actors being invited to play a vital role in resolving the tensions between the awkwardly 
configured privatised power system. We argue that we can see here an example of the co-provision of urban 
energy governance by both public and private sector actors working in consensual ways to resolve tensions 
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built into the market structure of the UK’s energy system. We now turn to a case study from the US to 
further develop these points.  
3.2 THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SMART GRID IN TEXAS 
“Literally, policemen are laid off if this utility doesn’t make a profit”  (Interview, Environmental Defense 
Fund). 
The Pecan Street Project reveals that although there are very different drivers in the Texan case, they none-
the-less point to the important role played by municipalities in shaping the future of urban energy provision. 
PSP’s status as independent non-profit allows it to act as an arms-length organisation outside of the control 
of any single actor, although its founding partners play a key role in directing research. Six organisations 
have seats on the board –The University of Texas, the City of Austin, the city-owned utility Austin Energy, 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Environmental Defence Fund and the Austin Technology Incubator (itself a 
business investment arm of the university). Below this board are a range of external companies who have 
provided funds and seconded staff to the project.  
The high-tech history of Austin and the city’s past experience with public-private partnerships has created a 
group of urban elites who have both accumulated experience of and been acculturated into the doings and 
sayings (Shove, Pantzar et al. 2012) of public – private collaboration across sectors. In 1982 several US 
computer and semiconductor manufacturers formed the Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation (MCC) in Austin – the first computer industry research and development consortium in the US. 
This was followed by Sematech in 1986. Both consortia were non-profit research and development 
organisations and worked in partnership with a diverse range of actors, including state and federal 
government officials, research institutions, business representatives and manufacturers. For Austin these 
consortia were very successful (Smilor, Gibson et al. 1989) in fostering the conditions for a similar entity to 
emerge in the form of the Pecan Street smart grid project. 
Although the PSP is a public-private partnership with the city-owned Austin Energy working with a number 
of private organisations many participants interviewed believe any smart grid should be private sector-led 
rather than driven by the state. Distributed generation technologies and demand management systems for 
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sale in an open market were preferred to a mandated state roll-out of smart technologies. Interviewees 
believed that the change to a new grid should be facilitated by purchases made by willing customers in a 
competitive market setting. Yet, interviewees in Austin also recognised that the deployment of new 
generation technologies and demand response software could reduce gross demand and therefore the 
utility’s revenue, on which the city relies for the provision of a range of otherwise non-energy related 
services, as illustrated by the quotation above. These contingencies between energy, the grid and public 
services are locally specific, no doubt, but they are part of a wider pattern in smart grid innovation initiatives 
in which risks and investments are shared by state and commercial entities. Central to this is a common 
discourse about the future of the grid and a shared rationale that partakes of commercial, environmental and 
governmental logics which, we argue, is a feature of the wider smart grid assemblages. We suggest that this 
means that in cities, new constellations of actors will increasingly look for ways to re-figure risks and 
rewards as part of the attempts to connect smart urban futures to the grid. However, while the purpose of 
smart energy technologies is hybrid in nature – drawing on these multiple rationales – the Austin case 
reveals that the techniques and apparatus through which grids are becoming smarter are in many ways neo-
liberal. They remain based on consumer choice-making and responsibility as the engine for the 
transformation of energy provision. In so doing contribute to the normalisation of the view of the urban 
citizen as an economic agent, as is recognised by Strengers in her depiction of ‘resource man’ (Strengers 
2013) as the protagonist of smart grid narratives. In this way they contribute to the erosion of other possible 
narratives of smart urbanism including those of citizenship, sharing and solidarity. 
This can be seen in the imagined future of the urban fabric as host to a web of micro- and decentralised 
power plants in constant state of transaction. In Austin, researchers are experimenting with a system in 
which the energy utility is transformed into a socio-technical platform that facilitates peer-to-peer 
transactions between individual residents generating and consuming locally produced and only locally 
circulating energy. At thousands of small distributed generation nodes the utility aims to embed metering 
apparatus to record transactions as well as energy flows in order artificially construct and record the sale of 
discreet units of exchange as a means of disentangling an otherwise seamless state of electrical flow and 
potential. In so doing, the PSP is creating space and socio-technical apparatus for a new energy market to 
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emerge and facilitating individual transactions between urban residents. The utility will operate and maintain 
the underlying electrical infrastructure – transmission lines, a base generation capacity and an automated 
software management service – and the new system will charge a subscription fee to those wanting to 
operate within the decentralised marketplace. In this system rather than being an energy user each individual 
home and business is re-constituted as a ‘pro-sumer’ (producer and consumer). One interviewee described 
this ‘brokerage’ system: 
“I, as a utility operator, am going to be a sophisticated platform that provides energy one way when you 
need it, takes the energy the other way when you don’t need it, monitors the storage and the plug-in and 
brokers all this distributed onsite generation storage and consumption. I become the infrastructure, and I 
take a little fee for transactions for monitoring all this” (Interview, former Austin Energy executive, May 
2012). 
The aim is to provide all parties with “choices and control as opposed to giving the utility or government 
control” (interview, Environmental Defence Fund representative, May 2012). Thousands of pro-sumers will 
engage in constant micro-transactions with peers across the city and what was once a highly centralised, 
publically-managed grid network is imagined to become a dispersed, variegated and dynamic marketplace – 
yet still reliant on a large technical network owned and operated by the city. On top of this platform, third 
parties could develop their own software, hardware and services to sell to residents, while Austin Energy 
itself will provide a back-up guarantee of service to maintain a basic level of universality to the city. 
Through this mechanism, the initiative adopts perhaps the most emblematic feature of public-private 
infrastructure provision and capital expansion; the socialisation of risk and the privatisation of reward. 
4 ACTUALLY EXISTING GEOGRAPHIES OF SMART URBAN POWER 
The second claim we make about smart grids as features of real contemporary cities and those of the near 
future is that the conjunction of the urban placement of smart grids together with their hybrid political 
character which we have discussed above means that such projects need to be analysed in relation to their 
particular manifestations in specific places. Informed by Harvey’s insight that the urban entrepreneurialism 
he observed in the late 1980’s was driven by a political economy of place rather than territory (Harvey 
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1989b) we argue that actually existing smart grids are produced by a tension between the political economy 
of networked places and the regulated, territorial patchwork of the pre-existing energy economy from which 
projects are emerging. By networked place we mean both networks in the technical sense – the routes and 
limits of wires and ICT network coverage - as well as an emphasis on the public-private partnerships – the 
governance networks - already in place in cities and towns in the vanguard of smart energy experimentation.  
In addition to place-based urban interventions, territorially bounded smart networks are also being fashioned 
through the roll-out of one specific device – the smart meter. A number of smart meter-only projects have 
already been initiated globally, including in Australia, the UK, where the roll-out involves installing fifty 
million gas and electricity meters in twenty seven million homes by 2020, and the United States where as 
part of the Recovery Act over fifteen million smart meters have been installed nationally in each of the last 4 
quarters (Q3 2013 to , Q3 2014) (US Department of Energy 2014). These meters are positioned as necessary 
pre-conditions for the creation of smart urban spaces in which consumers are equipped with cultural and 
technical devices (market structures and metering) which make it possible for energy use and provision to 
take on new qualities. In more explicitly Foucauldian terms, we are arguing that these devices establish the 
conditions for new forms of energy use mentalities and forms of control to be cultivated. 
We find it troubling that the socio-technical imaginary of smart energy seems to be a placeless future in 
which the operating environment is smoothed through the erasure of local, mechanical, physical or 
contractual boundaries between actors, places and devices. Such devices, – what Deleuze and Guattari 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004) might call ‘striations’,  act as socio-technical markers which divide spaces up, 
reduce openness and impede flexibility and are notable through their absence from imagined smart futures. 
Indeed, Hubert observes that, “although they never mention it, the grid must stand as both the emblem and 
diagram of striated space.” (Hubert (n.d.) online). Our contention here is that it is only ever from this highly 
striated space that smart energy projects start. From these beginnings they seek to establish a hyper-
connected set of inter-infrastructures in cities in which nodes, such as homes or businesses, are always 
connected to everything and follow common protocols which mean also that anything can be plugged into 
anything. The imagined results being free-flowing data, instantaneous re-configurability and the avoidance 
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of interruption. The reality of actually existing urban smart grid assemblages is, perhaps inevitably, 
markedly different and we find them to be highly striated, uneven and constrained as a result of interactions 
between the totalising territoriality of smart metering roll-out and the supply markets and the durable 
geographies of networks and places. In the remainder of this chapter, we use the case studies of Austin 
Texas and the North East of England’s Customer Led Network Revolution to illustrate these points.  
4.1 MARKET TERRITORIES AND GRID PLACES  
We have argued above that the UK’s energy geography comes with in-built tensions as a result of its 
regionally licensed distribution network monopolies, urban smart grid initiatives the national scale led smart 
meter roll out. It is in places, often in cities,  where these geographies meet, interact and are negotiated. The 
UK’s national smart meter roll-out, aligned with the geography of the energy supply market, seeks to create 
a ‘smart nation’, in which locality and geographic specificities are overcome. It will be the responsibility of 
energy suppliers, active in the retail market, to buy or rent smart meters and distribute them to customers - 
passing on the equipment, admin and installation costs to a greater or lesser extent. In basic terms, the 
immediate benefits of a smart meter are that they provide accurate consumption feedback to the household 
and accurate meter readings to the energy company, usually every thirty minutes.  
Electrical distribution networks are structured differently. These are hierarchies of transformers housed in 
substations which bring voltage down from ultra-high voltage national transmission to the 400v low voltage 
distribution networks in most streets in the UK. As a result,  low-voltage network management and 
community engagement are conducted by distribution network operators at 'network scale', which is most 
naturally aligned to 'sub-station communities' – clusters of households and businesses determined by the 
layout of the wires which result from histories of regulation, network governance and engineering decisions. 
Motivations for smart grid development at the distribution level are, as a result, focused on enabling the 
anticipated connection of solar photo-voltaic panels, electric vehicles, electrically powered heat pumps and 
various forms of energy storage as well as finding ways to avoid or defer investment in network 
reinforcement. The goal of network trials such as the CLNR is to create local network flexibility as an 
alternative to costly reinforcement, which had previously been the dominant mode of securing network 
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reliability. Within this logic, contextually specific commercial risk and cost management can be seen to be 
working in interaction with governmental, regulatorially enforced commitments to renewables and supply 
security which exert pressure across the regulated space. What results is a rationale for innovation and 
experimentation through projects which seek to re-negotiate these tensions in each instance. 
The local is important for two reasons; firstly the local nature of DNO-led smart grids is in contrast to the 
national geography of supplier-led smart metering roll out. Secondly, even locally there is a preference for 
‘smooth’ space, with contiguous customer connections, the absence of boundaries and other ‘striations’. The 
reality is that every house in a street, or every flat in a tower block will have its own supplier relationship, 
broadband contract, mobile phone contract and may or may not have other contracts with gas, oil or biomass 
suppliers. In various ways these variegated states of connectivity amplify, attenuate or prevent customers 
from adopting an active or smart identity in newly configured urban smart grid assemblages. These 
striations, the lines between customers of different companies and between formal responsibilities and 
licenses to operate, also dilute the value of customer engagement and in many ways curb the possible 
contributions of the community to new forms of power provision. Until communities on common feeders 
begin to act together by choosing to group-purchase from a common supplier to achieve different forms of 
energy provision which work with and for them or until actors coordinate at the local level on behalf of the 
others stakeholders citizens will only able to engage with smart urban power in very diluted ways. This type 
of community scale self-awareness and action is of course a rarity. 
4.2 THE NEW SMART MARKETPLACE 
We now turn to the US case study to consider the implications of new market configurations in urban smart 
grids. By choosing to use a marketplace as a decision making and resource allocation engine the Pecan 
Street Project system introduces new forms of inequality. We interpret this as a form of power geometry in 
the way that processes of smart urban power touch down differently in different places and impact 
communities in different ways – with some benefitting from the opportunities associated with being a pro-
sumer and others being ‘on the receiving end’ (Massey 1993). For some socio-economic groups Austin 
Energy will be just one provider of energy management services with the development of highly 
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individualised and specialised products and contracts to choose from. This is not necessarily a negative 
aspect of the future smart grid and will be welcomed by many. However, residents with the time and 
resources will have opportunities and incentives to upgrade their own appliances to improve efficiency, 
install their own solar panels and wind turbines and then pay Austin Energy to manage their consumption 
and generation on their behalf. In effect, those able to do so will become players in the market, able to 
choose which flows to send or receive, which transactions to approve and on which terms to participate in. 
In contrast, those unable to afford the capital investment required to become owners of the still expensive 
distributed generation technologies could be forced onto flat-rate pay-as-you-go contracts with new and 
more constraining conditions about home appliance use, albeit through service offerings badged as ‘smart’ 
and ‘flexible’. In such situations, those configured by rather than configuring the smart grid will be 
positioned within flows and transactions orchestrated to enhance the positions held by more powerful actors 
in the market place. For example they will be reliant on making their rooftops ‘available’ to those in driving 
seat of smart urban power:  
“…They’d agree to reduced-cost appliance upgrades such as solar water heaters. They’d participate in 
Austin Energy’s demand response program, which might cycle off their air conditioners in fifteen-minute 
increments on the city’s hottest days. They’d agree to limit their peak use of non-essential appliances in 
favour of off-peak use. They would never be denied power when they need it. But they would agree that 
using energy at certain times – outside their service plan – would be “pay as you go,” just like tossing more 
garbage than will fit in your city-issued trash can is “pay as you throw”” (Pecan Street Inc, 2010: 16). 
As Graham outlined more than a decade ago such infrastructural ‘choice’ tends to be limited to “certain 
social and spatial groups within the city. The ability to access competing providers is dependent on wealth, 
location, skills and how lucrative one is to serve” (Graham 2000: 192). Creating a ‘pay as you go’ system 
for those unable to participate in Austin’s smart grid will mean that the conditions of possibility for some 
participants’ energy use will be markedly narrower than is currently the case. The potential for an increase in 
infrastructural splintering and the targeting of specific socio-economic groups was highlighted by one 
interviewee: 
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 “…we might actually be on the threshold of a word we used to use in the early days, of ‘customerisation’. 
We might actually get to the place where this technology enables the utility to say ‘these are stay-at-home 
moms who keep their air conditioner running and run the dishwasher and have the TV running and a couple 
of other appliances, and we really ought to figure out a way to keep all of them from being on-peak at the 
same time’. Go to their house, put these controls in place, stop them from quadrupling their peak for a few 
minutes at a time. But in my house where my wife and I are both gone all day, don’t deploy the hardware, 
… I would say that it’s probably going to be better for us to segment our customers before we try to deploy 
this crap to every single person” (Interview, Austin Energy executive, May 2012). 
This represents an extension of neo-liberal apparatus and techniques into the everyday life of citizens as part 
of making the public-private smart grid work. While Austin Energy, a state institution, will be rolled back 
from service provision for urban residents able to be active in the market, it will be simultaneously 
increasing the scope of their interactions with residents unable to fully become pro-sumers. In effect this is 
likely to result in hard-controlling their appliance use and introducing dynamic and time-of-use pricing as 
‘soft’ controls on overall energy demand. 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
Through these two case studies we have developed an analysis which points to cities and urban contexts as 
frontier spaces for  smart grids and which draws attention to the emergent geographical politics of actually 
existing, public-private assemblages beginning to deploy smart urban power. Both case studies offer 
warnings about the difficulties and various flexibilities (on the parts of consumers as well as those bringing 
the projects forward) needed to reconcile the tensions inherent in the knotted private apparatus of 
entrepreneurial urbanism and that of regulated power network management. They also illustrate the uneven 
power geometries at work which produce smart grids that will be experienced differently by different 
constituencies despite being driven by consensual multi-stakeholder partnerships unless significant efforts 
are made to attend to the unevenness that barriers, blockages and inequalities are producing, with clear 
differences between UK and US experiences.  The cases reveal that despite the promise of a smooth space 
for the development of new products, services, identities and innovations the reality is that the logic of 
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smart, at least for the short and medium term, is encountering a highly striated urban environment which 
limits the purchase that logics of smart grid have in terms of their ability to conjure radical energy 
transitions. This should be a clue to the immanent qualities of smart urban assemblages, that they are being 
produced by already existing embedded historical energy and urban geographies rather than being inserted 
into places from elsewhere, or from ‘the top’.  
The history of urban power outlined in Section 1 stands a useful reference point and exposes the ways in 
which urban power provision, smart or otherwise, is always variegated and tied to local economic 
geographies rather than being rolled out in a uniform manner a across territories. However, smart urban 
assemblages can in many ways be seen as the adoption by broad coalitions in urban contexts of the 
apparatus of the twenty first century economy and particularly its emphasis on flexibility and alertness 
which resonates so closely with the discourses and practices of smart cities being discussed elsewhere in this 
volume. This is in clear contrast to the dominant mode of infrastructure provision of twentieth century 
outlined in Section 1.1 in which network management valued and projected material strength and stability 
rather than socio-technical flexibility and alertness. 
Elsewhere in the chapter we have shown that the use of markets, digital devices and dispositions to create 
pro-sumers able to act and react to the ‘state’ of the grid is a distinctive change in how and from where 
reliable urban power is provided. It seeds the growth of many tiny nodes throughout the city which each 
contribute to secure (and hopefully clean) energy provision rather than having cities reliant on a small 
number of large, remote nodes of generation and control.  This comes hand in hand with a change in how 
citizens demand power. Following from this, we suggest that research on smart urbanism needs to use or 
develop analytic resources that can attend to the economic geographies of flexibility as they extend out into 
the everyday lives of citizens as well as how they force new forms of flexibility in terms of how public-
private initiatives allocate roles, risks and responsibilities. More particularly, while flexibility has received 
much attention from Geographers in studies of production and labour (Hudson 1989) we argue that 
geographies of flexible consumption and leisure have been relatively underutilised and have not yet been 
fully linked to the alertness and responsiveness that are becoming so central to smart urban assemblages.   
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We have suggested a number of ways in which the urban has implications for energy but we now turn to 
reflect on the consequences of smart urban power for the city. First we suggest that new forms of urban 
energy are deepening the sense in which the city is co-produced by a complex multiplicity of diverse actors, 
actants and processes. The partnerships and socio-technical accomplishments of smart grids considerably 
add to the degree of complexity in public-private arrangements that contribute to the constant re-
establishment of the conditions necessary for everyday life in the city; power., heat , telecoms and so on. 
However, these projects are becoming more central, more essential to the fabric or urban governance and to 
describe them as mere features of the contemporary city is unsatisfactory. Smart urban projects, among 
which smart power projects are some of the most significant and impactful, are (financially and 
geographically) sufficiently large and important that they can be thought of as  becoming a dominant style of 
project-work in the city. While writers in the assemblage urbanism literature have emphasised the, “multiple 
political projects, modes of governance, practices and outcomes of cities as assemblages (McGuirk and 
Dowling 2009) we suggest that within this picture of complexity and multiplicity there are some projects, 
some modes of government that are more central and more definitive of the new urbanism than others. We 
suggest that smart urbanism, and smart urban power as an important feature thereof, challenges the analytic 
neutrality of some assemblage thinking because of the sense in which a nervous system is being created as 
an end in itself, one which spans energy, heat, traffic, air quality and so on. This is a sensory apparatus in 
which, we acknowledge, there may be no single ‘brain’, no space or node of ultimate power or knowledge 
but in which the process of constructing sensory capabilities and connections constitutes more than just one 
project among may. These are attempts to connect the otherwise feral forces of urban assemblage through a 
socio-technical but always political process which will continue to induce a power geometry through which 
winners and losers are created and, in different ways, revealed and obscured. 
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